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Mexico’s Energy Regime Reforms: Rescission Risk, 
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Becky L. Jacobs* & Brad Finney**
INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, an international consortium of energy companies from 
the United States, Mexico, and the United Kingdom announced a 
significant crude oil discovery in shallow waters off the east coast of 
Mexico.1 This discovery is not only the fifth largest global oil discovery 
in the last five years and perhaps one of the top shallow-water fields 
discovered in the past twenty years, but, as “‘the first offshore exploration 
well drilled by the private sector in Mexico's history[,]’” it has historical 
significance as well.2
This important find was made possible pursuant to recent landmark 
reforms to Mexico’s energy legal regime that now allow foreign investors 
to participate in Mexico’s energy sector.3 Prior to these reforms, Mexico’s 
energy industry was among the most tightly controlled in the world, 
closely associated with national sovereignty.4 Indeed, many consider the 
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1. Jude Webber & Nathalie Thomas, Talos and Premier in ‘Significant’
Mexico Oil Discovery, FIN. TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content
/79969c16-66bb-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614. The consortium partners are Talos 
Energy LLC (U.S. – 35%), Sierra Oil & Gas (Mexico – 40%), and Premier Oil 
PLC (U.K. – 25%).
2. Id.
3. See generally Tim R. Samples, A New Era for Energy in Mexico? The 2013-
14 Energy Reform, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 603 (2016). This article will use the term 
“energy,” but it will focus on oil and gas production. However, Mexico’s 
constitutional reform included both the oil and gas and the electricity sectors and 
became law on December 21, 2013. Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan 
Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitucio n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
en Materia de Energi a ([Decree to Amend the Mexican Constitution on Energy 
Matters)], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.). A 
legislative package of nine new laws and a number of amendments to existing laws 
were drafted to implement the constitutional reforms and became law on August 12, 
2014. Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 11 de Agosto 
de 2014 (Mex.).
4. Id. at 611.
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Mexican petroleum expropriation of 1938 to be “the apogee of Mexican 
resource nationalism … [and] a patriotic triumph” that is celebrated as Oil 
Expropriation Day, a national holiday, each March 18th.5
Resource nationalism, sometimes expressed in its extreme form as
expropriation, is a systemic risk for private international oil companies.6
Given the historical precedent in Mexico for the use of expropriation 
within the energy sector, and with the recent upsurge in expropriations of 
foreign-owned oil assets in Bolivia, Ecuador, Russia, and Venezuela,7 the 
Mexican government’s approach to dispute resolution was a critical factor 
for foreign investors eager to take advantage of the Mexican energy 
reforms. While the reform package does authorize parties to exploration and 
production (E&P) contracts to agree upon alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, including arbitration,8 it also contains a controversial unilateral 
rescission exception that could greatly impact foreign investors.9
This article will briefly review the history of oil production in Mexico 
and the governing legal regime in Part I, and in Part II, the recent reforms 
to that regime thereto. Part III will consider the reform’s dispute resolution 
                                                                                                            
5. Noel Maurer, The Empire Struck Back: Sanctions and Compensation in 
the Mexican Oil Expropriation of 1938, 71 J. ECON. HIST. 590, 590 (2011). 
6. George Joffé, Paul Stevens, Tony George, Jonathan Lux & Carol Searle, 
Expropriation of Oil and Gas Investments: Historical, Legal and Economic 
Perspectives in a New Age of Resource Nationalism, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY LAW &
BUS. 3 (2009). Expropriation is defined as “[a] governmental taking or 
modification of an individual’s property rights, esp. by eminent domain[.]”
Expropriation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A discussion of the 
nuances of the various forms of expropriation are beyond the scope of this article. 
This risk is present regardless of whether the foreign investor contracts directly 
with the host government. In fact, as one commentator noted, because 
international commercial law generally prohibits from recourse to host 
government assets, there are legal risks attendant to project contracts that 
implicate the host government’s assets. Brandon Marsh, Preventing the 
Inevitable: The Benefits of Contractual Risk Engineering in Light of Venezuela’s
Recent Oil Field Nationalization, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 453, 457-58 (2008).
7. Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin & Konstantin Sonin, Determinants of 
Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data, 27 J.
L. ECON. ORGAN. 301, 301-03 (2011).
8. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.), translated in THOMPSON & KNIGHT, HYDROCARBONS 
LAW 12, https://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/5f93e40d-fc4d-445c-b7f9-7d
c1cc20b56e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9b630df7-5e9e-4e9c-a2f6-80af
30e552ff/Mexico-Hydrocarbons-Law-English-Translation.pdf (last visited Oct. 
24, 2017).
9. Id.
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provisions and administrative rescission. Part IV will offer possible 
mechanisms by which foreign investors might mitigate the risk of 
administrative rescission to protect their investment in the Mexican energy 
sector. The final reflections of this article will focus upon the status and 
current success of Mexico’s attempts to attract large international 
companies to invest significant amounts of capital and assets into 
Mexico’s energy industry, despite concerns related to unilateral rescission.
I. HISTORY
A. Oil Production: Mexican Patrimony
Oil production is part of Mexico’s cultural heritage.10 Beginning with 
the Mayans and Aztecs,11 and with the introduction of commercialized oil 
production in the mid-19th century,12 hydrocarbons have become some of 
Mexico’s most important natural resources and a source of enormous
national pride.13 Article 27 of the nation’s Constitution enshrines the value 
of the industry, reserving to “the Mexican nation alone [the authority to] 
carry out all actions pertaining to the oil and gas industry without any work 
being performed by private companies,” as well as granting to “the people 
of Mexico all water and land, including mineral rights.”14
Prior to 1938, however, foreign investors had been permitted to 
produce oil in Mexico.15 In fact, leading up to the mid-20th century, 
approximately ninety percent of the oil production in Mexico came from 
subsidiaries of two large foreign companies, both of which exist in some 
form today and are still key figures in the energy industry.16
                                                                                                            
10. Alejandro Lopez-Velarde & Philip D. Vasquez, Historic Break with the 
Past: The New Foreign Investment Possibilities in the Mexican Oil and Gas 
Industry, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153, 154 (2014).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally id.
14. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, as amended, Art. 
27 (pre-reform), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 
(Mex.). See also id. at 155-56.
15. Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://perma.cc/SG7L-UFTC (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). While there were fears 
that the 1917 Constitution might interfere with foreign oil investors operating in 
Mexico at the time of its enactment, the Calles-Morrow Agreement of 1928 reaffirmed 
the rights of oil companies to continue operations in the territories they had worked 
prior to 1917. Id.
16. Id. “Prior to expropriation in 1938, the oil industry in Mexico had been 
dominated by the Mexican Eagle Company (a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell 
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The oil and gas industry in Mexico grew at a substantial rate, and in 
the 1920s, Mexico became the second largest producer of oil in the 
world.17 Yet, political unrest and animosity towards the large foreign oil 
companies mounted within Mexico; foreign producers exported the vast 
majority of the oil, retaining only a small fraction of the profits from their 
Mexican production within the country’s borders.18
These issues reached a boiling point when Mexican labor unions sought 
higher wages from the foreign oil producers.19 In 1938, Mexico’s President, 
Lazaro Cårdenas, attempted to negotiate a settlement between striking oil 
workers and the oil companies. However, after the oil companies rejected 
settlement attempts and ignored both a government commission and an 
order from the Mexican Supreme Court, President Cårdenas expropriated 
the assets of these foreign oil companies through a decree dated March 18, 
1938.20 Mexico eventually agreed to compensate most of the companies 
with assets seized by the government, and conventional wisdom is that 
Mexico “did not pay the full value of the oil deposits . . . . In fact, [it 
compensated] only a third of total property values[.]”21
Following the expropriation of these assets, Mexico’s State-owned oil 
company, Petróleos Mexicanos, more commonly referred to as Pemex,22
was established.23 After the creation of Pemex, and until the reforms in 
2013, Mexico relied almost completely upon Pemex for the exploration, 
production, and distribution of oil and gas within Mexico and upon the 
revenue from its export.24
                                                                                                            
Company), which accounted for over 60% of Mexican oil production, and by 
American-owned oil firms including Jersey Standard and Standard Oil Company 
of California (SOCAL – now Chevron), which accounted for approximately 30% 
of total production.” Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Lorenzo Meyer, The Expropriation and Great Britain, in THE MEXICAN 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 169 (Jonathan Brown & 
Alan Knight eds., 1992). For a very different economic analysis of the 
expropriation, see Maurer, supra note 5.
22. When referring to Pemex throughout this article, the author may be 
referring to one or more of its many subsidiaries in order to avoid wordiness 
and/or unnecessarily complicated explanations unrelated to the primary focus of 
this analysis. 
23. See Dallas Parker et al., Mexico: A New Frontier: Mexico’s Energy 
Reform, MONDAQ (June 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/78PT-USBH; Lopez-Velarde 
& Vasquez, supra note 10, at 155-56.
24. See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 155-56. 
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B. Toward Reform
Despite what one academic has called the nation’s “Pemex Pride,” or 
the symbiotic relationship between oil and Mexican national identity,25
steep declines in oil production, weak gross domestic product (GDP)
growth in the Mexican economy, and years of capital underinvestment
coupled with a lack of available capital26 put pressure on the government 
to reconsider its restrictive legal regime in order to attract foreign 
investment and capital to the energy industry. During the latter part of the 
1990s, serious discussions began regarding private company participation 
in the energy industry.27 These discussions started to gain traction. 
The discussions led to actual change in 2008 when the Mexican 
government modified its regulations to permit Pemex to enter into 
“integrated service contracts” with private companies.28 The incentives in 
these integrated service contracts were limited to bonus payments based upon 
predefined production targets: standard industry contracts, concessions, and 
production/profit sharing agreements were still prohibited.29 Although these 
modifications were significant as they reflected a paradigm shift in the 
government’s approach to its energy resources, they had limited impact, 
largely because they failed to address the need for more meaningful private 
company incentives and involvement in both upstream and downstream 
activities.30
It became clear that more significant reform might be required when, 
in 2004, the amount of oil and natural gas produced in Mexico began to 
fall, with oil production ultimately declining by approximately one million 
barrels per day.31 This drop in production was not due solely to a lack of 
demand as there was, simultaneously, an increase of oil imports into 
Mexico.32 By 2012, nearly half of the oil in Mexico was imported, nearly 
double that imported in the late 1990s.33
                                                                                                            
25. Megan McDermott, Pemex Pride: The Symbiotic Relationship Between 
Oil and Identity in Mexico (Oct. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/D8W3-XDJB.
26. See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 155-56.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 156.
29. Tim R Samples & José Luis Vittor, Energy Reform and the Future of 
Mexico’s Oil Industry: The Pemex Bidding Rounds and Integrated Service 
Contracts, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 215, 227, 229 (2012).
30. See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 156.
31. Richard H.K. Vietor & Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason, Mexico’s Energy 
Reform, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE 717-027, at 3 (Aug. 2017). 
32. See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 156.
33. Id. at 156-57. 
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Decreasing Pemex revenues also drove the reform agenda. Capital 
constraints resulted in a lack of investment in maintenance and infrastructure 
in company assets. They also dramatically reduced the company’s 
contribution to the national budget.34 The Mexican economy was heavily 
dependent upon its energy industry, e.g., Pemex’s revenue totaled 
approximately one third of the entire budget of the Mexican government
throughout its history as a national monopoly.35
These conditions created the political space for the dramatic reform 
that resulted in the energy bill signed by President Enrique Peña Nieto in 
2013 that completely reformed Mexico’s energy industry by amending 
many articles of the Mexican Constitution.36 This reform, among other 
important features, allows for private investment in the downstream, 
midstream, and upstream sectors and ends Pemex’s monopoly of the oil 
and gas industry.37
II. THE REFORM
A. An Overview
The sweeping changes made to the legal regime governing Mexico’s 
energy industry are an amalgam of, among others, the new Hydrocarbons 
Law, amendments to Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the venerable Mexican 
Constitution of 1917,38 and to existing regulations.39 These changes opened 
                                                                                                            
34. See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, Mexico Country 
Commercial Guide, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE - INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Mexico-Competition-from-
State-Owned-Enterprises (last updated Oct. 3, 2016). 
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 5 de Febrero de 
1917, Arts. 25, 27, 28 (Mex.).
39. See Leopoldo Olavarría & Ryan Keays, Mexico Approves Energy 
Reforms, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Aug. 2014), https://perma.cc/5DRE-LBE6; 
Arturo de la Parra, Mauricio Llamas & José A. Estandía, Mexico’s New Regulatory
Framework for Oil and Gas, JONES DAY (Sept. 2014), http://www.jonesday
.com/mexicos-new-regulatory-framework-for-oil-and-gas/. A detailed account of 
all new legislation and of the laws that required amendments in order to implement 
the energy reforms is beyond the scope of this article; the undertaking was truly 
monumental.
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the Mexican energy industry to private foreign investment.40 This dramatic 
transformation is one for which foreign investors had long hoped. 
Reform of laws governing the exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons has generated the most interest from investors.41 The new law 
mandates that E&P contracts be awarded through a competitive, transparent 
bidding process, in which Pemex must compete with participating private 
companies.42 However, even if Pemex wins the auction, or if it is given a right 
to explore or produce through an asignacione, an entitlement to these oil 
fields that is a part of the holdover from the previous law, other entities may 
still have an opportunity to be involved in the activity.43 Pursuant to the 
new law, regulatory agencies have discretion to select from several 
contractual arrangements with varying risk profiles, including license 
agreements, production sharing agreements, profit sharing agreements, 
and service contracts.44
The new law converts both Pemex and the Federal Electricity 
Commission to “State Productive Companies,” the purpose for which is 
generating profits and creating value for their owner, the Mexican
government.45 Although State-owned, these entities are designed to operate 
as independent businesses, autonomous in terms of the management and 
budget decisions made by their respective boards of directors.46
The reform did not tamper with one fundamental aspect of Mexico’s 
“Pemex Pride:” Article 27 of the Constitution preserves the sovereign’s 
unequivocal ownership of all subsoil hydrocarbons.47 While some have 
                                                                                                            
40. See Diane Villiers Negroponte, Mexico’s Energy Reforms Become Law,
BROOKINGS (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/9XSQ-LQ6S [hereinafter Negroponte, 
Mexico’s Energy Reforms]; la Parra, Llamas & Estandía, supra note 39.
41. See Mexico Energy Reform Resource Center and Americas Colloquium, 
Mexico Energy Reform, HAYNES BOONE, https://perma.cc/9DCA-WXFX (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
42. LH art. 5, DOF 11-08-2014 (Mex.). See also Olavarría & Keays, supra note 
39; la Parra, Llamas & Estandía, supra note 39; Negroponte, Mexico’s Energy 
Reforms, supra note 40. See also Diane Villiers Negroponte, Mexico’s Secondary Law 
Provides a Path Forward for New Investments in the Hydrocarbons Sector,
BROOKINGS (June 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/PV3Q-9PYA.
43. See John B. McNeece & Michael S. Hindus, Mexico’s Energy Reform 
Provides Significant Opportunities in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production,
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN (Aug. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/KY9A-
7LDA.
44. See generally Samples, supra note 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Article 27, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-
156 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
argued that this might present accounting complications for foreign 
investors attempting to present accurate reserve figures,48 Article 27’s 
clear focus on “subsoil” hydrocarbons, a distinction that did not appear 
prior to the 2014 amendment, may provide the government with avenues 
for legal transfers or assignments after extraction.49
B. Further Changes on the Horizon for Mexico’s Energy Industry
As mentioned above, Pemex’s deteriorating financial condition was 
one of the primary causes of the sweeping reform in Mexico’s energy 
industry.50 Although it has improved since the reform took effect, the 
company is still confronting financial challenges.51 From 2015 to 2016, 
Pemex had nearly an eight percent reduction in total assets and a total net 
income loss of over $9 billion in the fourth quarter of 2015 alone.52 Pemex 
reduced its number of employees by approximately ten percent due to 
budget cuts of roughly $5.7 billion, and it is likely that Pemex will continue 
to lay off employees.53 This poor financial situation could lead to further 
industry restructuring, including strategic changes regarding Pemex’s use 
and investment of assets and an overhaul of its tax treatment.54
                                                                                                            
2014, http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-inttext-const.pdf (retaining, 
then repeating, the existing constitutional assertion of State sovereignty over subsoil 
resources).
48. James L. Sweeney et al., North American Energy, in NAFTA AT 20: THE 
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT’S ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
CHALLENGES 99, 112-14 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 2014). These authors have drawn 
a comparison to Canada’s E&P structure, under which private companies are 
authorized to explore and produce hydrocarbon reserves, but the Canadian 
provinces retain ownership of subsoil oil. Id.at 114.
49. Diana Villiers Negroponte, Mexican Energy Reform: Opportunities for 
Historic Change, BROOKINGS (Dec. 23, 2013), https://perma.cc/9P8F-TV8Q.
50. See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.
51. See id.
52. See Nacha Cattan, Adam Williams & Eric Martin, Mexico Gives Pemex Tax 
Break Worth $1.5 Billion, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 14, 2016, at 13C1, 13C4, 
https://perma.cc/2ZLB-RYV3; Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises,
supra note 34.
53. See id.
54. See David Alire Garcia, Mexico to Keep Pumping Pemex for Tax Money 
Despite Promised Reforms, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/5ACA-
DBB2; Turanzas, Bravo & Ambrosi, Mexico: Energy Reform – Chapter III: 
PEMEX Tax Regime, MONDAQ (June 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/J39M-G2AC; 
Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.
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The company’s financial condition has impacted its operational 
strategy.55 As its financial situation has weakened, Pemex appears to have 
abandoned plans to develop promising oil fields to which it had exclusive 
development rights.56 Rather than moving forward with new development, 
Pemex’s strategy appears to be identifying, focusing on, and improving its 
most profitable operating assets, eschewing high risk/longer time horizon 
fields with great potential.57 While its focus on efficiency reduced Pemex’s 
net losses by nearly sixty percent in 2016, this strategy may decrease the 
company’s overall revenues, particularly longer term.58
Many industry experts have considered how the company might 
improve its financial outlook.59 One idea addresses the negative impact of 
the Law of Hydrocarbon Revenues on Pemex’s allowable tax deductions.60
For example, in the first quarter of 2015, expenses reached over 200% of 
returns on operation because, under current law, Pemex is prohibited from 
fully deducting actual expenses.61 That deduction is calculated based upon 
a percentage of the crude oil price, a factor that does not always fluctuate 
in the same manner as operation costs.62 Thus, Pemex is unable to deduct 
expenses in the same way as can a private competing company.63 One of 
the solutions currently proffered is for the Mexican government to amend 
the Law of Hydrocarbon Revenues to level the playing field by allowing 
for Pemex to deduct closer to the amount of its actual operating costs and 
expenses.64 This seems to be a simple, yet effective, way to solve this 
problem and to improve Pemex’s bottom line.65
This tax issue and the proposed solution present an interesting 
dilemma for private industry.66 On one hand, Pemex’s current financial 
difficulties are creating opportunities for its competitors.67 The State 
company’s withdrawal from several potentially lucrative development 
opportunities opens these prospects to private investors.68 Conversely, a 
                                                                                                            
55. See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. But see Negroponte, Mexico’s Energy Reforms, supra note 40.
62. Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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financially unstable Pemex that consistently loses billions of dollars per 
year is not a particularly attractive business or joint venture partner.69
Investors seek reliable partners, those willing and able to cover their share 
of costs and safely assume risk when investing in high risk/high reward 
E&P projects but with longer-term production horizons.70 That same 
dilemma is likely present regarding any number of potential reform issues 
that may affect Pemex.71
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE HYDROCARBONS ACT
A. Article 21
The specters of Mexico’s 1938 expropriations and of the more recent 
nationalizations in the region are ever-present for foreign investors 
seeking entry to Mexico’s energy sector. The 2013-2014 reforms attempt 
to alleviate concerns regarding similar “capricious government action.”72
Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Act specifically authorizes parties to E&P 
contracts to agree to utilize arbitration and other alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms as provided in the Mexican Commercial Code, 
which incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, and the relevant international treaties to which 
Mexico is a party, such as the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration.73 Should E&P contracting parties choose 
arbitration, Article 21 imposes three explicit conditions upon arbitral 
proceedings and agreements: (1) Mexican federal laws must be the 
applicable law; (2) the arbitration must be conducted in Spanish; and (3) the 
award shall be based upon applicable law and shall be final and binding for 
both parties.74
                                                                                                            
69. See Olavarría & Keays, supra note 39; la Parra, Llamas & Estandía, supra
note 39.
70. See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.
71. See id.
72. Kyle Doherty, Comment, From “The Oil Is Ours!” to Liberalization: 
Resource Nationalism and the Mexican Energy Reform, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 245, 
260 (2015).
73. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de 
Agosto de 2014 (Mex.); Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, June 16, 1976, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245. See Alejandro Escobar, The 
Mexican Oil & Gas Reforms: Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in the 2014 
Mexican Hydrocarbons Act, 2 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND. 13C-1, 13C-12
(2015) (referring to Código de Comercio, Arts. 1415-1480).
74. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).
2017] MEXICO’S ENERGY REGIME REFORMS 159
Article 21’s most significant limitation, however, is its exclusion of 
disputes regarding unilateral administrative rescission by Mexican 
regulators from any form of alternative dispute resolution, reserving to the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over those disputes.75 Pursuant to 
Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, the Mexican Executive Branch, 
through its Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, or National Hydrocarbons 
Commission (CNH), may unilaterally rescind an E&P contract under the 
following enumerated circumstances: (1) the contractor does not 
commence, or suspends, the planned E&P activities without due cause or 
approval from the CNH for a continuous period of more than 180 days; (2) 
the contractor fails to comply with the minimum work commitment; (3) the 
contractor assigns, totally or partially, the operation or the rights conferred 
in the E&P agreement without the prior approval of the CNH; (4) the 
contractor’s willful misconduct or negligence causes a serious accident 
which damages infrastructure or causes a fatality or loss of production; (5) 
the contractor, willfully or without cause, provides false or incomplete 
information or fails to disclose to the relevant authorities information 
regarding production, costs, or any other relevant aspect of the contract; 
(6) the contractor fails to comply with a final resolution of any federal 
jurisdictional entity having res judicata effect; or (7) the contractor fails, 
without cause, to make any payment or delivery of hydrocarbons to the 
Mexican State in accordance with the time periods and terms established 
in the contract.76
Although arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution are explicitly 
allowed and encouraged by Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Act, any and all 
disputes that relate to the government’s unilateral administrative rescission 
are explicitly excepted from being submitted to these processes.77 The 
Executive prerogative to unilaterally rescind the contract combined with the 
contractor’s inability to submit such issues to arbitration is likely concerning 
for many potential investors, particularly those from jurisdictions with a 
                                                                                                            
75. Id.
76. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.), translated in THOMPSON & KNIGHT, HYDROCARBONS 
LAW 11-12, https://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/5f93e40d-fc4d-445c-b7f9-
7dc1cc20b56e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9b630df7-5e9e-4e9c-a2f6-80a
f30e552ff/Mexico-Hydrocarbons-Law-English-Translation.pdf (last visited Oct. 
24, 2017). See also Escobar, supra note 73, at 13C-7-9; Olavarría & Keays, supra
note 39.
77. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.); Escobar, supra note 73, at 13C-7. 
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common law tradition.78 Article 20 appears to seek to somewhat temper the 
discretion granted to the Executive Branch by limiting the scope of these 
rather broadly-worded rescission triggers to “las causas graves,” or serious 
causes.79 When one considers several of the “serious causes” specifically 
set forth in Article 20, such as failing to make a payment with no peso or 
dollar floor below which the rescission would not be appropriate, the 
limiting phrase itself is quite ambiguous, if not entirely meaningless.80
B. Dispute Resolution in the Model E&P Contracts
The language of Articles 20 and 21 left many questions unresolved for 
investors as to the Mexican government’s vision regarding dispute 
resolution under the Hydrocarbons Law. Analysis of the Model Contracts 
published as part of Mexico’s inaugural post-reform, deep-water tender 
open to private sector investors provides some insight.81 This “Ronda,” or 
round, of bidding involved exploration and production in ten deep water 
oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico with a total reserve potential of up to eleven
billion barrels, including the tender to participate with Pemex in the deep 
water ‘Trion’ field.82
While, as discussed in Part II, the reform approved four contract 
structures for E&P agreements, i.e., license, production sharing, profit 
sharing or service, the form utilized in this bidding round was a license.83
The relevant provisions of the Model Contracts appear in Articles 23 and
26.84 Article 23 sets forth the conditions both for administrative rescission 
in Article 23.1 and for a separate right of termination for breach in Article 
                                                                                                            
78. See id. Mexico’s legal system, laws, and Constitution, however, were 
influenced by French and Spanish law, the traditions of which customarily granted 
the Executive Branch the power to change the conditions of, or completely rescind 
a contract.
79. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).
80. Id. 
81. Alejandro Aurrecoechea, Mexico’s Deep-Water Oil Round: The Time Of 
Truth For Energy Reform?, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/8K38-WF3N.
82. Id.
83. Contrato para la Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos Bajo la 
Modalidad de Licencia (Aguas Profundas), COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE 
HIDROCARBUROS (Model Contracts) (Aug. 31, 2016), http://rondasmexico.gob.mx 
/l04-ap-contratos/. There were two Model Contracts: one for individual entities and 
another for consortia. Id. Because the provisions governing dispute resolution and 
administrative rescission are identical in both Models, this article will not 
distinguish between the two versions.
84. Id. at Arts. 23, 26. 
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23.4.85 While the circumstances warranting rescission enumerated in 
Article 23.1 generally mirror those in the Hydrocarbons Law,86 Article 
23.1 contains several additional definitions that appear to be attempts to 
provide more clarity regarding “rescissive” circumstances, perhaps to 
reassure private international entities expressing hesitation about investing 
under such insecure legal conditions.87
While an exhaustive analysis of these provisions of the Model Contracts 
exceeds the scope of this article, a brief summary of several of Article 23.1’s 
more interesting supplementary definitions is relevant. For example, 
Article 23.1(d)’s “Accidente Grave,” or Serious Accident, is further 
defined as requiring three listed conditions in the conjunctive, i.e, damage 
to the facilities, loss of life, or loss of production,.88 Other clarifications 
pertain to the legal terms of art “Sin Causa Justificada,”89 or without just 
                                                                                                            
85. Id. at Arts. 23.1, 23.4. The justifications for contractual termination are 
set forth in Article 23.4 of the Model Contracts. Although there was substantially 
similar language in several of the grounds warranting Article 23.1’s
administrative rescission and Article 23.4’s contractual termination, such as Work 
Plan delays, the final published draft, dated August 31, 2016, appears to have 
resolved much of this duplication, eliminating at least a significant source of 
potential ambiguity and conflict. See Model Contracts, supra note 83. 
86. See supra text accompanying note 8.
87. Fernando Cano-Lasa, Mexico Energy Reform: Dispute Resolution for 
Operations Facing Administrative Rescission of Their Exploration and 
Production Agreements, 39 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 5, 25-26 (2017).
88. Art. 23.1(i), Model Contracts, supra note 83. “Damage to the Facilities”
also is further defined as a situation “that prevents the Contractor from carrying out 
the Petroleum Activities in the Contract Area during a period exceeding ninety (90) 
Days as of the accident occurs[,]” as is “loss of production,” which “implies any 
uncontrolled destruction or leak of Hydrocarbons, equal or higher than ten thousand 
(10,000) barrels of equivalent crude oil; different from the vented, flared and 
discharged under standard operating conditions during the performance of the 
Petroleum Activities conducted under the Best Industry Practices and the 
Applicable Laws. If the accident occurs during the Exploration Period, any Oil or 
Condensates spill or Natural Gas leak shall be considered as Loss of Production.” 
Id. at art. 23.1(i)(1), (3). “Información o Reportes Falsos o Incompletos,” or False 
or Incomplete Information or Reports, also has an expanded definition in Article 
23.1(v), requiring that they be “contrary to the truth or deliberatively insufficient in 
such a way that the minimum necessary elements . . . cannot be [ascertained] . . . 
according to their nature and purpose, and presented with the deliberate intent to 
deceive the CNH or any other Governmental Authority in order to obtain an undue 
benefit that would have come as a result of the submission of truthful and/or 
complete information.” Id. at art. 23.1(v).
89. Translated, “[a]ny cause attributable without any doubt to the Contractor 
. . . .” Id. at art. 23.1(ii).
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cause; “Culpa,”90 or fault; and “Dolo o de Forma Dolosa,”91 or willful 
misconduct, none of which provide the level of certainty that likely would
assuage investor concerns about legal risks associated with administrative 
rescission.
In addition to these definitional clarifications, CNH created a 
procedural framework that may provide reassurance to investors that the 
Commission will not invoke the rescission clause imprudently. Article 
23.2 provides for a mandatory investigation period of not less than thirty 
days and not more than two years.92 During this time, the contractor shall 
guarantee the continuity of the E&P activities so long as they are safe and 
technically viable.93
Should CNH determine that just cause for rescission exists, Article 
23.3 establishes the administrative process.94 Briefly, CNH is required to 
provide written notice to the contractor of the cause or causes invoked,
after which the contractor has thirty days to respond.95 Within the next 
ninety days, CNH must evaluate the contractor’s arguments and evidence
and seek approval within its formal governance structure before 
rescission.96 Most relevantly to this analysis, Article 23.3 mandates that all 
disputes regarding administrative rescission shall be resolved exclusively 
by the federal courts of Mexico, as provided in the Model Contracts’ 
Article 26.4.97
With the exception of this federal court carve-out for administrative 
rescission, Article 26 is the primary “Applicable Law and Dispute 
Resolution” provision of the Model Contracts.98 Article 26.1 selects the 
                                                                                                            
90. To paraphrase the translation, any action or omission of the Contractor 
that causes a result that, even if not foreseen, was foreseeable, or, if foreseen, was 
the result of the Contractor’s confidence that it would not materialize and that was 
derived in the violation of the Applicable Laws or a violation of a duty that was 
objectively required to be observed regarding industrial safety. Id. at art. 23.1(iii).
91. Translated, “[a]ny action or omission of the Contractor or the 
Participating Companies with the intention of pursuing a result directly.” Id. at
art. 23.1(iv).
92. Id. at art. 23.2.
93. Id.
94. Id. at art. 23.3.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Article 26.4 does authorize contractors to initiate arbitral proceedings 
pursuant to Article 26.5 of the Model Contracts, but “only for the determination 
of the existence [and quantification] of damages that result” in a cause or causes 
of administrative rescission determined by a federal court to be unfounded. Art. 
26.4, Model Contracts, supra note 83. 
98. Art. 26, Model Contracts, supra note 83. 
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laws of Mexico as the governing law.99 Articles 26.2 and 26.3 describe a 
mandatory conciliation procedure that must be undertaken in accordance 
with UNCITRAL’s Conciliation Rules prior to the commencement of 
arbitration.100
Arbitration with a three-member panel is specified as the post-
conciliation process for dispute resolution, again, with the exception of 
disputes pertaining to administrative rescission.101 Article 26.5 selects the 
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague as the 
nominating arbitral authority, The Hague as the seat, and the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration of The Hague as the arbitral administrator.102 The arbitration 
shall be conducted in Spanish, its substance governed by Mexican law, and 
its resolution in strict accord with the law.103 Pursuant to Article 26.7, 
contractors may not suspend E&P activities during the pendency of a dispute, 
unless the parties agree otherwise or unless the CNH rescinds the relevant 
contract.104 Further, the Model Contracts explicitly reference and confirm the 
applicability of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and state that all awards shall be final and binding.105
C. The Consequences of Administrative Rescission
Administrative rescission results in serious legal and financial 
consequences for contractors.106 While still liable for compliance with 
numerous onerous contractual obligations, the Model Contracts demand 
that the contractor pay contractually calculated liquidated damages; cease 
all non-essential E&P activities; and transfer of ownership to Mexico 
without compensation of all machinery, tools, equipment, goods, supplies, 
infrastructure, etc. acquired, provided, leased, or otherwise held for use for 
the E&P activities without compensation.107 The Model Contracts do 
                                                                                                            
99. Id. at art. 26.1. 
100. Id. at art. 26.2, 26.3. 
101. Id. at art. 26.5.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at art. 26.7.
105. Id.
106. Art. 23.1, Model Contracts, supra note 83. Pursuant to Article 23.5 of the 
Models, these consequences also result in the event of a contractual termination 
pursuant to Article 23.4. Id. at art. 23.5. The seriousness of these impacts is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that, unlike disputes concerning administrative 
rescission, contractual termination disputes are not excluded from the dispute 
resolution provisions of the Models’ Article 26. Id. at art. 26.
107. Art. 23.5, Model Contracts, supra note 83. 
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provide for the possibility of a settlement, but the language is far from 
encouraging,108 and the contractor likely will have little leverage at that 
point with which to question any government data or calculations.
As one observer noted, the Model Contracts’ administrative rescission 
provisions demand that an investing party essentially agree to expropriation 
by contract.109 Given the Mexican government’s history of expropriation, 
investors would be unwise to ignore this threat, despite its obvious 
commitment to the reform and the economic realities driving the reform.
D. A Cautionary Tale of Two Clauses: Commisa v. Pemex and the 
Possibility of Parallel Proceeding
Mexico attempted to clearly differentiate the allocation of responsibility 
between the federal courts and arbitral tribunals in the new Hydrocarbons 
Law and the Model E&P Contracts published pursuant thereto. However, 
while the federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction for disputes relating 
to or in connection with administrative rescissions110 and arbitral tribunals 
are authorized to process any other claims,111 one can envision several 
circumstances under which parallel proceedings might arise.
The Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. 
De C.V. v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción (Commisa v. Pemex) case112
demonstrates the hazards inherent in the dichotomous approach that the 
Mexican government has taken by carving out an exemption for 
administrative rescission from Article 21’s dispute resolution structure in 
the Hydrocarbon Law. 113 Although this legal saga began in pre-reform era 
2004 and dragged on for over thirteen years, the underlying facts in the saga 
are not particularly unusual.114 Yet, this cautionary tale illustrates the legal 
complications that can arise when parties engage both the administrative 
rescission and arbitration provisions of a contract simultaneously, or in 
parallel, with regard to a single matter, or related matters.115
                                                                                                            
108. Id.
109. Brad Finney’s quite astute statement in an initial draft of this article.
110. Art. 23.1, Model Contracts, supra note 83.
111. Id.
112. Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. 
v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622 (2017) [hereinafter Commisa v. Pemex].
113. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).
114. Commisa, 832 F.3d at 97.
115. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).
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Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De 
C.V., more commonly referred to as Commisa, a subsidiary of KBR, Inc., 
is a large engineering and construction company. In 1997, it contracted to 
build two offshore gas platforms for Pemex’s E&P subsidiary, Pemex 
Exploración Y Producción, in the Gulf of Mexico.116 The contract between 
these two parties contained a Mexican choice of law clause as well as 
dispute resolution provision specifying arbitration in Mexico.117 Similar to 
the post-2013-2014 reform Model E&P Contracts, the Commisa-Pemex
contract authorized Pemex to unilaterally rescind the contract administratively
in the event of breach by Commisa or upon its failure to perform.118
When the working relationship between the parties began to 
deteriorate, Pemex invoked the rescission clause, alleging that Commisa 
had not met its contractual deadlines and that it had abandoned its work 
on the two offshore gas platforms.119 Commisa sought arbitration while 
simultaneously disputing the constitutionality of Pemex’s rescission in the 
Mexican courts.120
Commisa brought two proceedings, which resulted in different 
outcomes.121 In 2009, the arbitral tribunal found in favor of Commisa on 
its breach of contract claim and entered an award for over $300 million in 
damages.122 Its constitutional claims were not, however, successful in the 
Mexican courts. At the lower court level, the rescission was found to be 
both constitutional123 and within the bounds of the contract.124 In 2011, on 
appeal to the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Court of Appeals, the court 
held that Commisa’s $300 million arbitration award was against public 
policy, concluding that Mexican administrative law did not permit the 
arbitration of claims against a government agency and, accordingly, 
annulling the arbitral award.125
Commisa v. Pemex arrived in the U.S. courts in 2010 when Commisa 
attempted to enforce its arbitral award.126 A U.S. federal district court 
determined that the arbitral award should be enforced as the Mexican court 
                                                                                                            
116. Commisa, 832 F.3d at 98. While the court refers to the Pemex entity as 
PEP, these authors have retained the Pemex denomination. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 97-99.
122. Id. at 99.
123. Id. at 98-100.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 99.
126. Id.
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ruling that annulled the arbitration award offended core principals of 
justice.127 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision in 2016,128 and Pemex requested that the U.S. Supreme 
Court take this case.129 Instead, the parties reached a settlement of the 
matter in 2017, prior to any substantive action on the part of the Supreme 
Court.130
The willingness of these U.S. courts to affirm an award that the host 
country had annulled caused alarm throughout the international investment 
community, and there was significant interest in the ultimate response of 
the U.S. Supreme Court to objections raised in Commisa v. Pemex.131 Most
consider the ability to execute an arbitral award in any country in which 
the losing party has assets to be the most attractive feature of international 
arbitration.132 Both the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention)133
and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
of 1975 (the Panama Convention)134 authorize courts in member States to 
enforce arbitral awards rendered in foreign States.135 Each of these 
conventions provides limited circumstances under which a court may 
                                                                                                            
127. Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. 
Pemex-Exploracion y Produccion, 962 F. Supp. 2d 642, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(history omitted). A discussion of the entire history of the case, including its first 
appearance at the trial court and on appeal, is omitted to avoid a lengthy and 
unnecessary discussion. The opinion cited reflects the case on remand. Id. at 652.
128. Commisa, 832 F.3d at 119-20.
129. See Caroline Simson, Battle Over KBR Unit’s $300M Award Heads to 
Supreme Court, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/94M4-NE6Y.
130. See KBR Resolves Decade Long Dispute in Mexico, OFFSHORE ENERGY 
TODAY (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/CP5F-QFZ8.
131. See, e.g., Letter Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America, 
Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex 
Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2016) (No. 13-4022).
132. See Nathan M. Crystal, The Duty of Competency in International 
Transactions: Part II, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2012, at 9, https://perma.cc/7DXK-NMC2.
133. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [New 
York Convention].
134. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990) [hereinafter Panama Convention].
135. An arbitral award will only be recognized and enforced under the Panama 
Convention if the award was rendered in a State that has acceded to the Convention. 
Id. at § 304. See also R. Doak Bishop & Elaine Martin, Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 3, 9-10.
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refuse to enforce an otherwise eligible arbitral award,136 one of which is a 
“set aside” pertaining to awards that have been annulled or otherwise set 
aside by a competent authority in the issuing country.137
At least one other court has taken this approach when considering 
whether to enforce a foreign arbitral award that had been annulled by a 
court in the primary jurisdiction. In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt,138 one of the first cases in the United States to raise this 
issue, the District Court for the District of Columbia enforced an arbitral 
award issued in Egypt, despite its annulment in Egyptian courts, stating 
that to do otherwise would “violate . . . clear U.S. public policy[.]”139
While the courts in these two cases did not do so, other U.S. courts 
have exercised their set aside discretion with regard to vacated foreign 
arbitral awards.140 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is 
one such court, ruling in the 2007 TermoRio v. Electranta case that an 
award set aside or annulled in the arbitral seat is no longer enforceable in 
the United States. In this case, the D.C. Circuit held that “secondary States 
(in determining whether to enforce an award) routinely second-guess the
judgment of a court in a primary State, when the court in the primary State 
has lawfully acted pursuant to ‘competent authority’ to ‘set aside’” a 
domestic arbitration award.141 A power purchase contract was at issue in 
the TermoRio case. The agreement obligated Electranta, an entity owned 
primarily by the Colombian government, to purchase power from 
TermoRio, which was owned by a U.S. corporation.142 Although the 
contract stipulated that all disputes should be settled in arbitration, a 
jurisdictionally-appropriate court in Colombia, the Consejo de Estado,
vacated a $60.3 million arbitral award granted to TermoRio in the U.S., 
reasoning that the Colombian law in effect as of the date of the Agreement 
                                                                                                            
136. See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 105-06; Bishop & Martin, supra note 135, at 
10-11. 
137. See 832 F.3d at 105-07; Bishop & Martin, supra note 135, at 10-11. For 
example, Article V of the Panama Convention limits, inter alia, the discretion of 
courts to refuse the recognition and execution of a foreign arbitral award to cases 
in which the requesting party is able to prove that the award “has been [annulled] 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made.” Art. V(1), Panama Convention, supra note 134.
138. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 
(D.D.C. 1996).
139. Id. at 913.
140. See e.g., TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938, 941 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 
(2d Cir. 1999).
141. 487 F.3d 928.
142. Id. at 930-32. 
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did not expressly permit the use of the procedural rules that were applied 
in arbitration.143 Here, the D.C. Circuit refused to interfere with a 
“peculiarly Colombian affair” concerning as it does “a dispute involving 
Colombian parties over a contract to perform services in Colombia which 
led to a Colombian arbitration decision and Colombian litigation.”144 The 
court noted that the discretion to refuse enforcement “is narrowly confined” 
to circumstances in which the foreign judgment is “repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought” 
or when it violates “basic notions of justice.”145 Accordingly, as the case facts 
were not “clear cut[,]” they did not meet that “high and infrequently met” 
standard for setting aside a foreign judgment.146
A similar result was reached in the Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. 
Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic, a case decided in the 
same federal district as was the Commisa case.147 The dispute in Thai-Lao 
Lignite pertained to a mining concession agreement between the Government 
of Laos and two private companies in which the parties agreed to submit 
disputes to arbitration in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.148 A Malaysian arbitral 
tribunal originally issued a $57 million dollar arbitral award in favor of the 
companies for claims of improper termination.149 The companies’ petition 
to confirm the award was granted by the district court; the Second Circuit 
affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.150
Shortly thereafter, however, the Malaysian courts vacated the arbitration 
award, concluding that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction.151
                                                                                                            
143. Id.
144. Id. at 939 (quoting TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora Del Atlantico 
S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87, 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 938-39 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 938 (citations omitted). 
147. See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-
597 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 2014).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 217. 
150. Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256, 2011 WL 3516154, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 
2011), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 150 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, ––– U.S. –––, 133 S. 
Ct. 1473 (Feb. 21, 2013). The award was also found to be enforceable in England 
by the English High Court of Justice, Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. Ltd. &
Hongsa Lignite (Lao Pdr) Co., Ltd. v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, [2012] EWHC 3381 (Comm), on October 26, 2012, but its enforcement 
was denied by the Paris Court of Appeal. See infra Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) 
Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, at *2 n.9.
151. Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18. 
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Victorious at home, the Government of Laos returned to the U.S. to seek relief 
from the district court’s earlier judgment granting enforcement.152 This time, 
due to a lack of “extraordinary circumstances,”153 the court determined that 
the judgments of the Malaysian courts “did not violate basic notions of 
justice” and reversed its earlier judgment enforcing the arbitral award.154
While the results in this case and in the Commisa case may appear 
contradictory, a focus on the “extraordinary circumstances”155 present, or 
absent, in their facts may offer a unifying theme156 to explain such seemingly 
divergent results. In Commisa, for example, the Mexican courts’ judgments 
retroactively applied a prohibition on arbitrability in favor of a State-owned 
entity, leaving Commisa without other legal avenues in which to pursue 
relief.157 Conversely, in Thai-Lao Lignite, the award had been set aside in the 
courts of a neutral, third country mutually selected by the parties on the 
universally-recognized ground, and it did not leave the unsuccessful parties 
without a remedy.158
This complicated and divisive issue is being disputed in courts 
internationally,159 and observers were eagerly awaiting a definitive ruling 
                                                                                                            
152. Id.
153. Id. at 227.
154. Id. at 230. 
155. Id. at 227. 
156. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in its amicus brief supporting Commisa 
in Pemex’s petition for certiorari, proposed a multi-factor balancing test to guide 
courts considering whether to exercise their discretion to enforce awards annulled 
by the courts of the arbitral forum. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioner-Appellee and 
Affirmance, Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De 
C.V. v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2016) (No 
1:10-cv-0206-AKH). This test presumes that all relevant treaty requirements have 
been satisfied: (1) the award must have been annulled; (2) by a competent authority; 
and (3) of a State in which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and it 
appears to explain the divergent results in the relevant cases. Id. The proposed multi-
factor balancing test includes a consideration of the following factors, if present: (1) 
the pro-enforcement bias of the applicable convention; (2) level of scrutiny afforded 
to the award, or grounds required, for annulment; (3) the characteristics of the 
annulment proceedings; (4) the likelihood that the annulment order would be 
entitled to recognition in U.S. courts; and (5) any other circumstances that could 
tend to shift the balance in favor of or against enforcement. Id.
157. Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
158. See Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28. 
159. This complicated and divisive issue is being disputed in tribunals and courts 
internationally. See, e.g., Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. v. OAO Rosneft, 2009 (Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal), XXXIV Y. B. Comm. Arb. 703; PT Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia) 
v. Rena Holding et al, 2007 (Cour de Cassation), XXXII Y. B. Comm. Arb. 299; 
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from the U.S. Supreme Court in the Commisa v. Pemex case. While a 
Supreme Court ruling might have provided some clarity and perhaps a more 
certain standard for courts pondering foreign court annulments of arbitral 
awards,160 the settlement of the case requires a longer wait for more clarity 
on the issue.161
Speculatively, however, it is conceivable that a Supreme Court ruling 
in favor of Commisa, confirming the arbitration award, might mitigate the 
rescission risk in Mexico’s energy regime, at least for investors with 
jurisdictional ties to the United States. While Mexican energy industry 
regulations explicitly provide that governmental administrative rescissions 
are non-arbitrable,162 some of the more ambiguous terms in the 
Hydrocarbons law and the Model E&P Contracts might offer investors the 
opportunity to begin parallel arbitration proceedings.163 If successful in that 
forum, investors could then seek enforcement of the awards in their home 
jurisdictions, particularly if Mexican authorities intervened in the arbitral 
process in such a way as to qualify as “extraordinary circumstances,”164
justifying the exercise of a court’s discretion to enforce arbitral awards.165
Conversely, had the Supreme Court chosen not to enforce the arbitral 
award, administrative rescission likely would assume an even higher risk 
                                                                                                            
Directorate General of Civil Aviation of the Emirate of Dubai v. International Bechtel 
Co. Limited Liability Company (Panama), 2005 (Paris Cour d’appel), XXXI Y. B. 
Comm. Arb. 629. See generally Julie Bédard, Lea Haber Kuck & Timothy G. Nelson, 
PEMEX and US Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards Nullified in their 
‘Home’ Courts, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q45M-CWWJ.
160. See Caroline Simson, Eyes on High Court to Weigh in on Annulled 
Arbitral Awards, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/6KMF-U4UT.
161. See KBR Resolves Decade Long Dispute in Mexico, supra note 130.
162. Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 
de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).
163. See id.
164. See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 100, 111. It is likely, however, that the ruling in 
Commisa does not actually apply to investors in Mexico’s energy industry given the 
current Model Contracts and stipulations. See id. at 111-112; Escobar, supra note 
73, at 13C-3-10; Barry Fitzgerald, BHP Billiton Breaks Mexican Oil Barrier in 
Pemex Deal, AUS. NEWSP., Dec. 7, 2016, https://perma.cc/B6X6-WPWV. Under 
the current energy reform, the private party clearly is agreeing to not submit any 
issues regarding the rescission of the contract to arbitration; thus, this might not 
violate the notions of justice as the parties are explicitly agreeing to not arbitrate 
these issues. See Escobar, supra note 73, at 13C-7. And, it could be argued that the 
ruling in Commisa is inapplicable to current energy agreements because unlike 
current energy agreements, Pemex and Commisa did not agree to not submit any 
contract rescission issues to arbitration. See 832 F.3d at 102-110.
165. Cf. Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214. 
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profile for foreign investors. It is unclear whether this risk would significantly 
impact the number of investors and the amount of money those investors 
would be willing to commit to Mexico’s energy industry. However, a “non-
enforcement” ruling from the Supreme Court would likely have caused some 
hesitation from investors.166 It is possible that a holding from the Supreme 
Court in which the justices had elected not to enforce the arbitration award 
would ultimately have hurt the Mexican government in its quest to revitalize 
the energy industry.167
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE RESCISSION: RISK MITIGATION
Given the implicit tension between Articles 20 and 21 of the 
Hydrocarbon Law and the strong potential for disagreement regarding any 
contractual ambiguity, foreign investors must seek mechanisms to counter 
this particular risk. There are several options that may mitigate, if not 
entirely eliminate, this legal vulnerability, a few of which are considered 
briefly in the following text. 
A. Extra-Contractual Options
1. NAFTA and Other International Investment Agreements
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other 
international investment agreements (IIAs), including bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment agreements (MIAs), establish 
reciprocal substantive and procedural protections for foreign investors, 
including safeguards against expropriation of an investment by the host 
State and dispute settlement mechanisms outside a host State's legal 
system.168 Clause 26.9 of the Model E&P Contracts, with the heading 
International Treaties, clearly establishes that, as translated, “[t]he Contractor 
is entitled to the rights recognized by the International Treaties subscribed by 
the State.”169 Some commentators believe that this explicit reference to, and 
                                                                                                            
166. See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 111.
167. See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 155-57. 
168. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See generally North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc 
/FJZ3-87KC (last visited Oct. 25, 2017); Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc/2A76-38EM (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
169. Model Contracts, supra note 83.
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the investor protections of, these instruments may offer investors options 
for mitigating the risk of administrative rescission.170
Now, to the caveats, one of which is the potential conflict between the 
2013-2014 Mexican energy reform that relaxed the country’s restrictions 
on foreign investment in its energy industry and Mexico’s exclusion of that 
industry from NAFTA.171 NAFTA’s Chapter Six, titled Energy and Basic 
Petrochemicals, confirms “full respect” for the parties’ Constitutions172 and 
explicitly reserves for Mexico the entire spectrum of energy exploration, 
production, processing, transportation, storage, and supply chain, 
“including investment in such activities and the provision of services” 
therein.173 This reservation includes all energy sectors, i.e., crude oil and 
natural gas; artificial gas’ basic petrochemicals and their feedstocks; basic 
petrochemicals; electricity supply, with some exceptions; and various 
aspects of nuclear power.174 This industry exclusion also appears in
NAFTA’s Annex III, which prohibits private investment in, inter alia, the 
hydrocarbon industry and provides that any such investment “shall not be 
construed to affect the State’s reservation of those activities.”175
The impact of the 2013-2014 energy industry reforms on NAFTA are 
subject to some debate. Some argue that the reform’s constitutional 
changes would be sufficient to integrate the new energy regime without 
amendment, and others contend that its reservations must be modified.176
There remains much uncertainty as to whether NAFTA’s terms were 
drafted so as to integrate, without amendment, future legal developments 
within the party State. Unless these States have an appetite for a highly 
politicized NAFTA amendment process177 and can negotiate mutually-
                                                                                                            
170. See, e.g., Rob Nikolewski, Energy Looks to be Spared in any NAFTA Reset,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 20, 2017, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com
/business/sd-fi-nafta-energy-20170526-story.html. 
171. Compare Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.), with NAFTA, supra note 168, at art. 608 
& Annex 602.3.
172. Art. 601(1), NAFTA, supra note 168.
173. Id. at art. 602.3(1).
174. Id.
175. Annex III, NAFTA, supra note 168.
176. See Rosío Vargas, Energy Reform: 20 Years After NAFTA, 48 PROBLEMAS 
DEL DESARROLLO: LATINOAMERICANA DE ECONOMÍA (Apr.-June 2017).
177. See, e.g., Antonio Martinez, What a Changing NAFTA Could Mean for 
Doing Business in Mexico, HARV. BUS. J. (June 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/AL3X-
B7L5. Consider, however, the notice of arbitration that KBR, the parent company 
of Commisa, filed against Mexico in 2013 alleging breaches of different provisions 
of Chapter XI of NAFTA as well as Article 1503(2). While this filing warrants its 
own analysis, which cannot be conducted in this article, it is interesting to note that 
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satisfactory terms, this uncertainty likely will remain until tested in the 
courts or an arbitral forum.178
Putting those reservations aside, non-NAFTA investors with 
jurisdictional claims to countries with which Mexico has executed an IIA179
containing typical dispute resolution provisions may have cause for
optimism. IIAs often specify that investor-State disputes shall be arbitrated 
under the umbrella of the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID),180 and, while Mexico is not a member of 
ICSID,181 it has established treaties pertaining to direct foreign investment 
with numerous countries, including, at last count, twenty-nine BITs.182 Some 
of these treaties allow for arbitration pursuant to ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules183 or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.184 These arbitral administrators 
offer both neutral decision-makers and a neutral regime relatively 
unencumbered by party ties and, hopefully, influences. The majority of IIAs, 
including a number of Mexican IIAs, specify: the provisions of the 
                                                                                                            
Mexico did not make any claim of arbitrability ratione materiae with regard to its 
Chapter 6 and Annex III reservation of all activities related to the hydrocarbons and 
electricity industries, including the exclusion of disputes arising therefrom from 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 dispute resolution procedures and notwithstanding private 
contracts. Gabriel Cavazos Villanueva, Arbitration and Investment Protection 
within the Context of the Energy Reform in Mexico: A First Approach Based on
COMMISA v. PEMEX and KBR v. Mexico, in ESTADO DE DERECHO Y REFORMA 
ENERGETICA EN MÉXICO (Baker Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, 2017) (discussing KBR’s 
NAFTA filing in connection with Commisa v. Pemex).
178. But see Villanueva, supra note 177. 
179. Although it can prove to be a controversial strategy, multinationals often 
structure their transactional entities to take advantage of BIT protections. See 
generally Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring 
and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 11 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225 (2015).
180. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
181. Database of ICSID Member States, INTL. CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org//about/Database-Member-States.aspx.
182. See Investment Climate Statements for 2016 - Mexico, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://perma.cc/V89Y-U35Y (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); Additional 
Facility Rules, ICSID Convention (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en
/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf.
183. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Australia – Mexico Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, Austl.-Mex. art. 13(4), Aug. 23, 2005, 2483 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into 
force July 21, 2007). 
184. Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 19.3 (Dec. 
15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
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agreement itself and general principles of international law as the 
applicable law;185 they often are crafted in multiple languages, each text 
being equally authentic; and they generally do not appear to impose 
unbalanced, onerous arbitral language requirements upon investors.186
Their scope of covered investments is generally broad,187 but one might 
find potentially troublesome exclusions in Mexican IIAs, including 
language exempting resolutions that prohibit or restrict investment by its 
counterpart’s investors from the dispute settlement provisions.188
Investor-State disputes resulting in investment arbitration generally 
are not contractual disputes, unless the contract’s arbitration clause names 
the ICSID as the arbitral administrator. Several courts have held, however, 
that prejudicial State interference with arbitration may violate either 
investment or other treaties.189 For example, the European Court of Human 
Rights decided a number of cases that involved the issue of execution of 
national and international arbitral awards, most of which alleged violations 
of the “fair trial” provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).190 In these cases, the Court 
                                                                                                            
185. NAFTA signatories, however, are entitled to protections from the treaty 
regardless of the limitations of international law. See generally Pope & Talbot 
Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1357 (2002).
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34(1), Regulations and Rules, ICSID Convention (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.world
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Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute 
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 804-05 (2008) (“[P]reliminary empirical work 
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187. See e.g., Mahnaz Malik, Bull. #1, Definition of Investment in 
International Investment Agreements, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABILITY DEV. 1 (Aug. 
2009), https://perma.cc/WW3A-8E89.
188. See, e.g., Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic 
of Austria on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 29, 1998 (entered 
into force March 26, 2001). Article 19 of the Mexican-Austria BIT, titled 
Exclusions, states that “[t]he disputes settlement provisions … shall not apply to 
the resolutions adopted by a Contracting Party which, for national security 
reasons, prohibit or restrict the acquisition of an investment in its territory, owned 
or controlled by its nationals, by investors of the other Contracting Party, 
according to the legislation of each Contracting Party.” Id. at art. 19.
189. Case of Regent Company v. Ukraine, App. No. 773/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2008), https://perma.cc/98RW-L34H; Case of Kin-Stib and Majkic v. Serbia, App. 
No. 12312/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2010), https://perma.cc/T2L7-5HMH.
190. See supra note 189; European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950 (entered into force Sept. 
3, 1953) (Article 6(1) states, in pertinent part: “In the determination of []civil 
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consistently has ruled that a commercial arbitration award is property
under Protocol 1 of Article 1 of the ECHR and that, without valid reasons, 
a failure to enforce such an award violates that Convention’s Article 6.191
Additionally, at least one arbitral tribunal, considering claims relating 
to the State interference with arbitration, has concluded that a party’s 
arbitral award “crystallized” the investment at issue in the dispute.192 The 
next logical argument is that the award itself may constitute jurisdictional 
investment. An award pursuant to an arbitral proceeding might endow the 
prevailing E&P investor with standing to pursue an independent claim 
against Mexico in an IIA, or perhaps even pursuant to NAFTA.
There is the caveat that any arbitration provisions in Mexican IIAs are 
subject to the same concerns attendant to the tension between the 
administrative rescission remedy and the dispute resolution structure 
prescribed in the Hydrocarbon Law and the corresponding provisions in 
the Model E&P Contract.193 However, those IIAs with robust arbitration 
clauses and with no NAFTA-like industry or other investment exclusions 
might prove helpful for foreign investors participating in Mexico’s energy 
sector.194
2. Political Risk Insurance
Given that E&P operations generally require significant fixed 
investments, firms in that sector are often subject to governmental actions 
and socio-environmental conditions that threaten their investments. 
Terrorism, widespread criminal activity, general lawlessness, or popular 
uprisings and insurrection are all, of course, political risks to investors; these 
risks often manifest in the form of responses by host, or, even their home,195
                                                                                                            
rights . . ., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”).
191. See supra notes 189-90. 
192. Saipem v. Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Provisional Measures, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07 (Mar. 21, 2007) & Award 
(June 30, 2009). 
193. See infra Part IV.B. 
194. See Isabel Fernández de la Cuesta, Bilateral Investment Treaties Would 
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Energy Reforms, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/KJJ4-S75G.
195. Home countries, even those most developed, often create political risk for 
energy investors. For example, the British government, in 2005, retroactively 
increased its tax rate to 50% for oil and gas producing companies in the North 
Sea. See Brown Doubles North Sea Oil Tax, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/7FPA-MUZR. U.S. investors, and in particular, oil companies, 
have been impacted by economic sanctions that the U.S. has imposed on a number 
176 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
governments to increasing resource nationalism, national security concerns, 
or other post-contractual events.196 Such responses by the foreign 
government may include the direct or indirect expropriation of assets;197 the 
amendment, abrogation, or termination of contracts; currency manipulations, 
transfer restrictions, or availability; or the breach of, or improper interference 
with, contracts.198
To manage these particular risks, investors should consider purchasing 
political risk insurance (PRI) or some form of international or governmental 
export credit guarantee or funding that achieves the same purpose. The 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), export credit agencies, other governmental 
agencies, and private insurers such as Lloyds of London and Chubb all offer 
insurance products for specific political risks, including Expropriation, 
Nationalization, and Deprivation (CEND) risks; selective discrimination; 
political violence; and terrorism.199
OPIC is a frequent insurer in this market for U.S. investors.200 It is part 
of the executive branch of the U.S. government and was one of the very 
first PRI providers.201 Its products are available to U.S. companies doing 
business in and/or investing in particular emerging markets, including 
                                                                                                            
of oil-producing States such as Iran. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996), 35 I.L.M. 1273 (1996). Consider too the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 16 (1994), and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 14 U.S.C. § 1422 (1994), which also may impose 
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196. Joffé et al., supra note 6, at 3-4.
197. Expropriation does not only result from direct governmental seizure of 
assets; it may also be the product of State regulatory actions. Indirect, or creeping, 
expropriation, which sometimes is also referred to as a regulatory taking, can pose 
just as great a threat to investors as the more direct form of expropriation. See 
generally id.
198. See id.
199. A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk 
Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas Industry, 15 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS & ENERGY L. 79, 99-100 (2010). 
200. OVERSEAS PRIV. INVEST. CORP., https://perma.cc/MT7A-J58S (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2017). This website offers much more detailed information regarding 
OPIC’s eligibility requirements, coverage limits, etc. See also OVERSEAS PRIV.
INVEST. CORP., OPIC HANDBOOK, https://perma.cc/3QET-A38F (last visited Oct. 
27, 2017). 
201. Id.
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Mexico.202 It provides extensive coverage from expropriation, impairment 
of contract, regulatory risk, tumult caused by political upheaval, and other 
improper foreign government interference actions.203 Additionally, OPIC 
offers arbitral award default and denial of justice coverage204 that protects 
U.S. companies as well as their debt and/or equity investors.205 OPIC also 
provides enhanced coverage for petroleum E&P in developing countries, 
including protection against interference with operations and expropriation, 
defined as losses attributable to unilaterally-imposed material changes in 
project agreements by host governments and as asset confiscation of 
tangible assets and bank accounts.206
MIGA, another popular PRI insurer, was established by an international 
convention as a member of the World Bank Group.207 This agency insures 
projects that promote foreign direct investment into developing countries in 
order to enhance confidence among cross-border investors.208
All PRI policies, however, have limitations. Eligibility requirements 
may exclude certain investors or countries,209 and coverage limits may be 
inadequate,210 a grave concern when making E&P investments. There also 
may be gaps in specific coverage areas. For example, some PRI will not 
compensate investors for some forms of expropriations, including those 
arising from actions provoked by the investor, from lawful host State 
regulation or taxation, or from host State actions taken in a commercial 
                                                                                                            
202. Political Risk Insurance, OVERSEAS PRIV. INVEST. CORP., https://perma.cc
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INVEST. CORP., https://perma.cc/4X9A-RGQT (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
203. Political Risk Insurance, supra note 202.
204. See Arbitral Award Default, OVERSEAS PRIV. INVEST. CORP., https://per
ma.cc/7N4R-SELK (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
205. Id.
206. OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 200, at 22-23.
207. World Bank: Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency art. 26, Oct.11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1617. 
208. History, MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, https://www.miga.org
/who-we-are/history/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
209. See Insurance Eligibility Checklist, OVERSEAS PRIV. INVEST. CORP.,
https://perma.cc/7S3S-C8A2 (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). See also OPIC
HANDBOOK, supra note 200, at 5-6, 10, 12, 17.
210. For example, OPIC has no minimum investment requirement for PRI, but 
it does limit coverage to $250 million per project and up to $300 million for 
projects in the oil and gas sector that have offshore, hard currency revenues. Oil 
and gas projects with investment grade credit and with offshore, hard currency 
revenues may be approved for up to $400 million if the project receives a credit 
evaluation of investment grade or higher. OPIC has no minimum investment size 
requirements. See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 200, at 16.
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capacity.211 Relevant to hydrocarbon investors, “OPIC will not compensate 
for loss of reserves of any kind.”212 Currency inconvertibility coverage is 
another example where there may be PRI gaps; some policies may not 
protect against host State currency devaluations as they are characterized 
as a “commercial” risk.213
Limitations, however, are inherent in any risk management option. 
They should not deter foreign energy investors in Mexico from seriously 
considering PRI as one mechanism for minimizing the risk of expensive 
and prolonged legal proceedings caused in the event of an administrative 
rescission. 
Investors have a number of other extra-contractual214 risk management 
devices, many of which might be characterized as common sense. It seems 
obvious, but many potential disputes can be avoided by cultivating good 
working relationships with international and host country partners; with 
government officials, administrators, and administrative staff at all levels 
of government (and with their counterparts in opposition parties); with 
local community members; with non-governmental organizations and 
other civil society groups; with the press; and with lenders and insurers. 
So too can sharing technology and expertise generously, exceeding local 
content and labor requirements when possible; and investing in local 
communities.215 Conversely, most foreign investors seek to minimize 
physical assets in the host State and to match or transfer as much risk as 
possible to third party contractors that are better able to manage particular 
risks, such as material supply.
While it is impossible to eliminate all risks, investors can and do 
implement well-planned strategies for its mitigation. In addition to these and 
other extra-contractual mechanisms, potential investors in the Mexican 
E&P sector can make effective use of contract terms as a hedge against 
uncertain legal risks like administrative rescission.
B. Contractual Options
For those investing in Mexico’s E&P sector, the government’s Model 
Contracts will govern their activities. Such pre-published models often 
leave scarce opportunity for revisions or for the negotiation of new 
                                                                                                            
211. See, e.g., OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 200, at 18.
212. Id. at 23.
213. See id. at 18.
214. The authors refer here to the investment-specific contracts rather than to 
any other of the multiple contracts that document a large E&P investment. 
215. See, e.g., Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International 
Petroleum Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 219 (2002).
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terms.216 In the event that such an opportunity arises or that conditions 
change, however, common contract clauses may provide some measure of 
protection against the legal risks inherent in the potentially conflicting 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Hydrocarbon Law and their counterparts in the 
Model Contracts.
A joint enterprise with local and international partners is one contract 
structure that provides both contractual and extra-contractual risk 
management. It does so by contractually spreading an investor's risk over
a larger pool of stakeholders as well as by extra-contractually deterring 
interventionist host State action.217 The inclusion of local entity partners 
may be an effective method of allocating to them project political risks, 
such as using dollar-denominated or indexed pricing, local exchange rate 
and inflation risks, and force majeure clauses related to local conditions. 
Because governments often provide guaranties to their local entities, these 
risks ultimately are passed along to them.218 There are some who contend 
that local partners create more problems than they solve,219 but strategic 
joint ventures that align a host government’s financial interests with an 
investment are often seen as a valuable deal structure, risk-management 
wise.
Holdback clauses are among the many post-closing price adjustment 
terms included in all manner of transactional agreements that serve the 
purpose of performance bond to incentivize party compliance with 
contractual commitments. 220 The release of the funds, held either by the 
payor or in escrow, generally coincides with the guarantee period.221 The 
contracting parties agree on the holdback process. While details vary in 
different contracts, one party withholds a certain percentage of the total 
value of the contract from each payment until certain conditions are 
satisfied or until project completion, contract expiration, or some other 
pre-determined time.222 Upon completion, and subject to failure of any 
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217. Waelde & Ndi, infra note 233, at 232-33.
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219. Symposium, Energy & International Law: Development, Litigation, and 
Regulations, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 55-56 (2001).
220. Mark A. Cassanego, Holdback Escrows in M&A Transactions, CARR 
MCCLELLAN (Feb. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/6T8U-678Q.
221. Id.
222. See Holdback Clause Examples in Asset Purchase Agreements, LAW 
INSIDER, https://perma.cc/PU4F-S28A (last visited Oct. 27, 2017); see also 
Holdback Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://perma.cc/N73P-K89G
(last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
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conditions, the withholding party releases any remaining funds.223 The 
parties often agree that the withholding party will pay interest on the 
money being withheld.224
The conditions under which a party is authorized to release the funds, 
or conversely, pursue a claim against the holdback funds, warrant 
particular attention and should be carefully crafted to avoid ambiguity and 
future misunderstandings. Events that trigger the release of funds may 
include target production levels, the expiration of closing price adjustments 
or representations and warranties, or milestone dates.225 Parties seeking 
holdback funds often make claims pertaining to alleged breaches of 
representations and warranties or covenants and to adverse litigation.226
Creative, flexible mechanisms for revenue sharing between host 
governments and private investors are other contractual options that may 
mitigate political risks such as administrative rescission. Limited only by 
the creativity of the negotiators and the mutual appeal of the mechanism,
these contract clauses align the economics of projects between investors 
and the host government. They can take many forms, such as minimum, 
minimal royalties with possible longevity incentives and/or baseline 
escalators in the event of an in increase in market prices above pre-
determined levels.227 Escalating royalty structures based upon a 
combination of contract longevity and market prices are another variation, 
as are options that establish inverse tax rates-to-market price formulae.228
Structures such as these not only may insulate investors from the risk 
of rescission, they also provide a reliable and stable source of income for 
host governments.229 Because royalties are most often calculated as a
percentage of gross revenues, without reductions for depreciations or other 
tax deductions claimed by the investor, this maximizes income for both 
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the host government and for the investor, with the added investor benefit 
of quicker recovery of sunk costs.230
The calculation of royalties and other contract payments for Mexican 
E&P activities is set forth in Annex III of the Model Contracts, styled 
Procedures to Determine Considerations. 231 Pursuant to Article 4.1 of 
Annex III, the amount of the royalties will be determined for each type of 
hydrocarbon through the application of the rate corresponding to 
contractually specified values, with a consideration of State participation 
in production and additional investments commitments and subject to 
annual adjustment.232 The success of alternative means of revenue 
allocation in Mexican E&P projects is dependent on the government’s 
willingness to consider extra-Model options. Properly structured, however, 
alternative options provide incentives for host countries to avoid 
administrative rescissions.
There are other tools by which investors can align project economics so 
that both benefits and risks are shared with a host State. For example, 
economic and/or legal stabilization clauses may alleviate concerns of 
foreign investors with the State’s commitment to stabilize a contract’s
economic bargain233 or the laws governing a project rules, either 
universally or for individual projects.234
A total government take (TGT)235 term can be an effective economic 
stabilizer. This term can be used in an offset clause, above which the 
investor would get a credit. The TGT would include all exactions from every 
level of government, including all taxes, duties, and royalties over the life 
of the contract, and other total projected distributions.236 Should the 
government enact new legislation or regulations or apply existing laws in 
such a way that it raises government TGT above the baseline, the increases 
would be offset against future payments to stabilize distributions.
Liquidated damage clauses provide another contractual mechanism 
for minimizing any economic uncertainty pertaining to a legal risk such as 
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an administrative rescission. 237 These clauses pre-determine the damages 
due in certain events of breach. 238 The calculations attempt to project what 
damages would accrue should the clause be activated.239 Estimates such as 
these are notoriously difficult to predict, and, in order to avoid having the 
clause declared enforceable by a reviewing court, drafters should take care 
that the sum is not grossly disproportionate to realistic projections of actual 
damages.240
The administrative rescission language of Article 23 in the Model 
E&P Contracts appears to exclude the possibility of liquidated damages in 
favor of the investor.241 To the contrary, investors are liable for 
contractually calculated liquidated damages following a rescission.242
While there is settlement language in the Models, its calculations are 
strictly conscribed.243
Foreign investors participating in the Mexican E&P sector could seek 
to utilize such a clause in their agreements, should they have an opportunity 
to negotiate terms.244 Similar to holdbacks, liquidated damages clauses can 
be useful disincentives to contractual breaches. Ideally, if an investor were 
able to include a reciprocal liquidated damages clause, one that takes into 
account the damage suffered following an unlawful administrative 
rescission, i.e., the value of seized assets, lost revenue, etc., it certainly 
would partially mitigate the risks associated with that governmental act.245
All of the contractual options briefly considered above are useful risk 
management tools for foreign investors in uncertain markets. For those 
investing in Mexico’s E&P sector, because their Mexican counterparts have 
little incentive to negotiation additions or amendments to government’s 
Model Contracts, contractual options may have limited value in minimizing 
the legal risks inherent in the conflicting administrative rescission remedy 
and the dispute resolution structure set forth in the Hydrocarbon Law and
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the corresponding Model E&P Contracts.246 Mexico has a good deal of 
leverage as there has been intense interest, and, to date, gratifying
participation in its E&P tenders.
CONCLUSION
Mexico’s energy reform was designed to attract foreign investment to 
the industry, and it creates significant opportunities for investors to 
capitalize on the vast reserves of Mexican natural resources. However, 
inherent risks inure to E&P, risks related to the uncertain nature of the 
sector, but also to elements of the legislative and contractual architecture 
of the reform itself.
Mexico’s long history of producing and selling oil is troubled by the 
country’s expropriation of foreign energy company assets. The government-
owned entity created in the wake of those expropriations, Pemex, which has 
controlled the oil segment of the country’s energy industry, has been 
described as being of “quasi-religious significance to the Mexican 
people.”247 Indeed, labor unions and civic organizations have taken to the 
streets to protest Mexico’s energy reforms.248 Coupled with the recent 
wave of energy nationalizations in the region and elsewhere,249 investors 
may have legitimate concerns about making the type of substantial 
investment that is required and typical for hydrocarbon E&P. 
Mexico’s recent energy reform considerably decreases the amount of 
control that Pemex has within this industry, yet expropriation and government 
interference remain concerns for foreign investors. Additionally, while the 
dispute resolution provisions of the reform legislation were designed to 
reassure foreign investors, the administrative rescission exemption 
therefrom certainly may undermine investor confidence in the 
government’s commitments. The Commisa v. Pemex case illustrates this 
risk quite dramatically.
Investors should carefully evaluate the administrative rescission 
exception as they calculate their risk tolerance for Mexican energy projects. 
There are mechanisms, extra-contractual and contractual, available to 
foreign investors to minimize potential risks. However, several of the 
world’s largest oil companies have decided that the potential rewards are 
worth the risk, with both individual firms and consortia placing bids in the 
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fourth round of the first tender, Round 1.4, to conduct E&P in ten of 
Mexico’s deep-water oil fields.250 Among the companies participating either 
individually or as part of a consortium were ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, 
Shell, Murphy, Statoil, Total, Lukoil, and China’s CNOOC.251 Pemex also 
offered a farm-out, or lease, of its E&P rights to the deep-water Trion block 
in Round 1.4, with Trion being one of the most promising of the Pemex 
assets.252
The majority of observers deemed Round 1.4 a great success, with the 
Mexican authorities drawing praise for their transparency and their 
willingness to improve the fiscal and contract terms for its oil and gas 
tenders in response to market demands.253 The improved terms obviously 
satisfied many market players: the total investment that may derive from 
this Round is estimated at $40 billion.254
The Pemex-BHP venture illustrates investor confidence in Mexico’s 
commitment to reform. In its agreement with Pemex, valued overall at 
U.S. $1.2 billion, BHP holds a sixty percent stake in the venture and agreed 
to drill one appraisal well and one exploration well, to acquire additional 
seismic data, and to commit approximately $320 million to the 
contractually-required three-year Minimum Work Program.255 It also 
agreed to pay an additional royalty of 4% over the base royalty rate of 
7.5%, and, should the venture partners agree to move beyond the 
Minimum Work Program, BHP must invest the remainder of the $570
million minimum contribution, inclusive of the expenditure on Minimum 
Work. What won the bid for BHP was its upfront cash payment of $624 
million, a figure that exceeded competitor BP’s $605.9 million equivalent. 
Despite the improvements that Mexico made to its program terms, the 
administrative rescission and dispute resolution provisions of the executed 
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contracts from Round 1.4 appear largely unchanged.256 The Model 
Contracts’ administrative rescission exemption from arbitration, however 
unlikely its exercise, might result in protracted parallel proceedings.257
Perhaps, given Mexico’s gratifying responsiveness to investor 
concerns, potential bidders might convince Mexican authorities to address 
the risks associated with the rescission and dispute resolution provision of
its contracting scheme. If not, investors must consider the many options 
available to mitigate that risk to ensure a more predictable legal environment 
for their new investments in Mexico’s energy sector.
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